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COMMENT 
PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY: TIME FOR 
MARYLAND TO ABROGATE AN ANACHRONISM 
"What some see as a doctrine of law that serves the best interest 
of family unity,. . . I perceive to be an antiquated idea that not 
on})' fOIls to accomplish that end, but may well have the opposite 
eJJect . ... "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few institutions of American society have been held as dearly or 
championed as eagerly as the family. To protect the integrity and 
traditional structure of the family, many jurisdictions have sought to -_ 
insulate parental behavior from judicial interference by adopting the 
parent-child tort immunity. Originally formed to preclude a child from 
recovering damages in a tort action against his parent, this immunity 
has been expanded to bar a parent's tort action against a child. 
Since the conception of the immunity in an 1891 case,2 many of 
the factors which had formed its underpinnings have been removed or 
nullified. The increased incidence of child abuse has created a strong 
societal interest in judicial investigation of intentionally inflicted inju-
ries. In addition, the prevalence of liability insurance has reduced the 
threat that family resources would be diverted to one family member to 
the detriment of all others. 
Application. of the immunity has not only failed to fortify the fam-
ily but has, in effect, penalized those individuals who maintain the fam-
ily unit. The parent-child tort immunity, intended to protect the parent 
or child-defendant, paradoxically has been invoked to frustrate a par-
ent's or child's recovery from the other's insurer, employer, and from 
any third party whose liability depends upon establishing the liability 
of the parent or child tort-feasor. 
In response to the widening gap between the intended effect of the 
immunity and its actual consequences, a growing number of jurisdic-
tions have abolished the immunity.3 Maryland, once a forerunner in 
I. Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 226, 388 A.2d 568, 571 (Gilbert, c.J., con-
curring), cerl. denied, 283 Md. 736 (1978). 
2. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). 
3. Twenty-one states have limited or abolished the immunity: Hebel v. Hebel, 435 
P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Gibson 
v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc); Ooms 
v.Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972) (construing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 52-572 (West Supp. 1982»; Tamashiro v. DeGama, 51 Hawaii 74,450 P.2d 998 
(1969); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Rigdon v. 
Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Rouley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
235 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. La. 1964) (applying Louisiana law); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. I, 199 N.W.2d 
169 (1972); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Ruperty v. 
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this trend by virtue of a 1951 decision which excluded "outrageous 
torts" from the immunity,4 has not advanced beyond this isolated ex-
ception.5 Deferring to the state legislature to abrogate the immunity, 
the Maryland appellate courts have refused to modify this anachronis-
tic defense.6 This comment examines the origin, development and de-
mise of the immunity and analyzes the effect of abrogation upon the 
family and the insurance company. 
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY 
A. The Common Law Parental Privilege to Govern 
Common law recognized that a parent possesses the privilege to 
govern and discipline the minor child because the parent is responsible 
for the child's development.7 The type of behavior protected by this 
parental privilege was limited, however, and the common law set forth 
that unreasonable or immoderate parental behavior would constitute 
tortious injury to the child.8 In a treatise that foreshadowed the guide-
lines applied more than one hundred years later to determine criminal 
Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 
A.2d 588 (1966); France v. A.P.R. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 
(1970); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192,297 N.Y.S.2d 529 
(1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1979); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 
364 (N.D. 1967); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Smith v. Kauf-
man, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 
1976); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); see W. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROS-
SER]; Casey, The Trend of Interspousal and Parental Immunity-Cakewalk Liahil-
ity, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 321, 321-22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Casey]. 
4. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). 
5. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland refused to modify the immunity in the 
following cases: Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1, 403 A.2d 379 (1979) 
(child injured on parent's business premises denied cause of action); Montz v. 
Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568 (child barred from recovering for inju-
ries incurred by mother's negligent driving), cert. denied, 283 Md. 736 (1978); if. 
Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (father's claim for damages for lethal 
injuries suffered by his wife due to his daughter's negligent driving barred), cert. 
denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971). 
6. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has refused to limit or abrogate the 
immunity and has held that the appropriate forum for such changes is the legisla-
ture. Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1, 8, 403 A.2d 379, 385 (1979); 
Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 229, 388 A.2d 568, 575, cert. denied, 283 
Md. 736 (1978); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 728, 272 A.2d 435, 441, cerl. de-
nied, 261 Md. 726 (1971). 
7. T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 420,421 (3d ed. 1862) [hereinafter 
cited as REEVE]. 
8. The parental privilege at common law established that a parent is liable for all 
actions not within the scope of moderate chastisement. REEVE, supra note 7, at 
420-21; see Gould V. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1836) (No. 5,636) 
(parent could be liable for battery that injured a child's health); Nelson v. Johan-
sen, 18 Neb. 180,24 N.W. 730 (1885) (parent could be liable for gross negligence); 
Lander V. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) (parent could be liable for battery). See gener-
ally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 910-11 (1972). 
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child abuse, Justice Reeve of Connecticut defined the parental privilege 
in 1816 by stating: 
The parent has the right to govern his minor child. . . . [HJe 
has power to chastise him moderately. . . . He may so chas-
tise his child as to be liable in an action by the child against 
him for a battery. The child has rights which the law will 
E.~<.?tect against the brutality of a barbarous parent . . . . 
[WJhen the punishment is . . . unreasonable, and it appears 
that the parent acted, malo animo, from wicked motives, 
under the influence of an unsocial heart, he ought to be liable 
to damages.9 
TJ:ris philosophy guided the courts in the three earliest American cases 
addressing the liability of a parent for tortiously injuring a child. 
The triad of American cases applying the parental privilege before _ 
1891 refused to recognize a parental immunity and stressed the poten-
tial liability of a parent for any harm suffered by a child that was 
caused by behavior unrelated to the administration of discipline or be-
yond the limits of moderate punishment. 10 Whether the parental be-
havior was immoderate depended upon three factors: the sensibility of 
the child; the circumstances surrounding the punishment; and the in-
strumentality used. II The right of a minor child to recover from a par-
ent tort-feasor, established in each of these cases, would, however, soon 
be curtailed by the 1891 holding of Hewlett v. George. 12 
9. REEVE, supra note 7, at 420. 
10. Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1836) (No. 5,636); Nelson v. 
Johansen, 18 Neb. 180,24 N.W. 730 (1885); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859). 
In Gould, the plaintiff-sailor alleged that the captain's injurious acts were beyond 
the moderate discipline that a parent or one standing in the place of a parent 
could administer with impunity. The court determined that the punishment was 
not inordinately severe and was, therefore, within the parental authority extended 
to the ship captain. The parental privilege, however, was only applied by the 
court as one factor determining the appropriateness of the captain's behavior and 
was not used as a complete defense. 10 F. Cas. at 863-65. In Lander, a student 
punished by a teacher for an incident that had occurred after school and beyond 
school grounds sued to recover for tortious injury. The Court of Appeals of Ver-
mont, in an approach consistent with that in Gould, applied a limited parental 
privilege to acts of moderate discipline. 32 Vt. at 117. Unlike the two prior cases, 
which addressed the potential liability of the tort-feasor for intentional injury, 
Nelson addressed the pote~tialliability of a parent or one acting in the place of a 
parent for negligent injury to a child. In Nelson, a child sustained severe injury 
after walking over a mile across the Nebraska prairie in unsuitable clothing. The 
court stated that had the defendant knowingly permitted the child to cross the 
prairie as dressed, he would have been liable for her ensuing illness. 18 Neb. at 
188,24 N.W. at 738. Although each of these cases involved a defendant acting in 
the place of a parent at the time of the injurious act, the courts applied the same 
factors and did not alter the substitute parents' responsibilities or privileges from 
those possessed by a natural parent. 
II. Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857, 858-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1836) (No. 5,636); 
REEVE, supra note 7, at 420-21. 
12. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). 
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B. The Birth of Parent-Child Tort Immunity - The Hewlett 
.Decision 
The tort in Hewlett arose when the plaintiffs mother placed her in 
an insane asylum in order to obtain the daughter's property.13 After 
being released, the daughter brought an action seeking compensation 
for the tortious injury she had suffered as a result of her mother's act. 
Disregarding prior case law, the court in Hewlett attempted to preserve 
societal well-being by precluding a child from pursuing a tortious in-
jury action against a parent. 14 The nature of the tort, the intent of the 
tort-feasor, and the injury caused to the plaintiff were never examined 
by the court in reaching its conclusion. The court focused solely upon 
the filial relationship of the plaintiff to the defendant and applied its 
novel conception of the parental right as encompassing all tortious in-
jury to the child. IS 
The Hewlett approach to resolving a tort claim differed markedly 
from that used in prior cases. Previously, a court faced with a child's 
tort claim against a parent first determined whether the tortious act in-
volved the administration of discipline. If the act was one of discipline, 
and thus potentially within the parental privilege, the court balanced 
the severity of the act against the child's right to be protected from 
brutal behavior. 16 A parent found by the court to have overstepped the 
bounds of permissible conduct would be liable to the child. In Hewlett, 
however, the court neither attempted to classify the parental behavior 
as an act of discipline nor acknowledged a child's right to be free from 
parental abuse. 17 Under Hewlett, a parent's responsibility for the child 
impermeably protected the parent from the child's claim, even if the 
alleged tort was repugnant to the parent's protective role. To support 
its holding, the court cited no authority but, instead, reasoned that the 
13. Id at 703,9 So. at 885. 
14. The court in Hewlett justified its holding by stating: 
[S]o long as the parent is under an obligation to care for, guide, and 
control, and the child is under a reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort 
and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The peace of society 
... forbid[s] [to] the minor child a right to appear in court in the asser-
tion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hand 
of the parent. 
Id at 705, 9 So. at 887. 
IS. Id The court determined that the daughter'S claim should be barred, but did not 
ascertain that the plaintiff was actually in a child-parent relationship with the de-
fendant. Noting that the daughter had been married and appeared to have only 
returned to the defendant's house temporarily, the court stated, "Whether she had 
resumed her former place in her mother's house, and the relationship, with its 
reciprocal rights and duties, of a minor child to her parent, does not sufficiently 
appear." Id 
16. See Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1836) (No. 5,636); Nelson v. 
Johansen, 18 Neb. 180,24 N.W. 730 (1885); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859). 
17. The court in Hewlett did not evaluate whether false imprisonment was within the 
scope of the parental privilege to govern a child or if the culpability of the act 
overshadowed any existing parental privilege. 
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general peace of society requires that a minor child be forbidden to 
assert a civil action against a parent. IS 
Despite the dearth of supporting authority in Hewlett, 19 the immu-
nity was enthusiastically adopted by other states.2° For example, in 
1903, a minor child in Tennessee was denied a civil remedy for the 
injuries she sustained after being brutally beaten by her father and 
stepmother.21 Two years later, a child in Washington was precluded 
from recovering in a civil action against her father who had been con-
victed of raping her.22 These courts did not deny that the parent had 
tortiously injured the child but rather acted to preserve family harmony 
by precluding the child's recovery.23 Despite ample factual bases for 
the conclusion that these families had little harmony or integrity to pro-
tect,24 the courts viewed societal well-being to be better served when 
the rights of an injured child-plaintiff were sacrificed to protect all par-
ents from becoming potential defendants. 
18. 68 Miss. 703, 705, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891). 
19. No authority from case law, common law, treatises, or legislative acts was cited by 
the Hewlett court to support its holding, probably because none existed. Com-
ment, The lJemise of Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 12 WILLAMETIE L.J. 605, 606 
n.7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as lJemise]. One commentator has noted that "no case 
has been found prior to 1891, either in England or in the United States, which 
even presented the question of a civil cause of action in tort [between parent and 
child] for personal injuries." McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. 
L. REV. 521, 527 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Torts]; if. Small v. Morrison, 185 
N.C. 577, 585, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (1923), in which the court stated: "If this restraining 
doctrine were not announced by any of the writers of the common law, because no 
such case was ever brought before the courts of England, it was unmistakably and 
indelibly carved upon the tablets of Mount Sinai." Id 
20. Tennessee was the first state to rely upon Hewlett, in the case of McKelvey v. 
McKelvey, III Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). The immunity, as established in 
Hewlett, has been adopted in some form in forty-two states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Puerto Rico. lJemise, supra note 19, at 606. For a list of these juris-
dictions, see id at 606 n.lO. See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904 (1972). 
21. McKelvey v. McKelvey, III Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). 
22. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). Roller was mentioned in many 
later decisions that allowed an exception for intentional torts. See, e.g., Emery v. 
Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 425, 289 P.2d 218, 221 (1955); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 
61,65,77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 286, 218 P.2d 445, 
449 (1950). For a discussion of the general exception to the immunity for inten-
tional tort actions, see Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 
COLUM. L. REV. 679, 687 (1966). 
23. In each of these cases, neither the parent's tortious act nor the actual relationship 
between the child-plaintiff and the parent-defendant was examined. A normal, 
protective relationship was erroneously presumed in each of these three early 
cases. See Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (child imprisoned by 
parent); McKelvey v. McKelvey, III Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (child bru-
tally beaten by parents); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (child 
raped by parent). 
24. In light of the lack of harmony reflected in the family situation in Roller, in which 
the parent raped the child, it is unclear why the court did not decide to limit the 
scope of the immunity. The court was bound by no prior decision, nor is there 
any evidence of any influential act of the legislature. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 
242,243, 79 P. 788, 788 (1905). 
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III. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE IMMUNITY 
In addressing a child's tort action against a parent, courts in those 
jurisdictions adopting the immunity routinely list three reasons for ap-
plying the parent-child tort immunity: (1) protection of the family's 
resources from the disproportionate enrichment of the plaintiff family 
member;25 (2) protection of family integrity and harmony;26 and (3) 
protection of parental discretion in the discipline and care of the 
child.27 Each of these justifications, however, is an inappropriate basis 
for denying a child's claim. 
Protection of the family's resources from disproportionate allot-
ment is an invalid justification.28 When a child's potential mental, 
physical, or emotional growth has been handicapped or his future earn-
ing power limited as a result of his parent's acts, the child has suffered a 
legally calculable loss and should be compensated.29 In addition, this 
justification is based upon the presumption that the family's resources 
are regularly shared by the family members. Although a parent has the 
duty to support a minor child, a parent is not bound to disperse funds 
equally between minor children.30 It is an unfounded assumption that 
a parent who has injured a child would, in the absence of a judicial 
award, disperse the family resources fairly with a proportionate share 
being given to the injured child. By refusing to allow a civil remedy, 
the court, in effect, aids the parent in the disproportionate deprivation 
suffered by the child. In addition, preservation of family harmony is 
not a valid reason to deny a child's action when the nature of a parent's 
tortious behavior has refuted the presumption that family harmony ex-
ists.3 ! Finally, protection of parental discretion should not be used to 
support the immunity's invocation when the discretion has been uncon-
25. This rationale was first expressed in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584, 118 
S.E. 12, 15 (1923), and is based upon the assumption that the family functions as 
one economic and social unit. Under this theory, it is reasoned that if a child 
receives compensatory damages for the tortiously inflicted injury he suffers, then 
the child withdraws a proportionate amount of the family's wealth. The welfare 
of other family members is therefore jeopardized while the plaintiff is inordinately 
rewarded. Id This concept presumes that an injured child has not suffered a loss 
that can be appropriately compensated and that any recovery would be too large. 
26. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 707, 9 So. 885, 888 (1891). 
27. Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 486, 13 N.E.2d 438, 444 (1938). 
28. For a discussion of the policy reasons favoring recovery from the parent, see Lee 
v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721,722-27 (W.Va. 1976); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons 
in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1069 (1930) [hereinafter cited as 
Domestic Relations). 
29. Domestic Relations, supra note 28, at 1068-75. 
30. Rice v. Andrews, 127 Misc. 826, 217 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1926). The child has no le-
gally recognized claim to any portion of the parents' property or any guarantee of 
an equal portion. Id at 829, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 530-31. 
31. As one judge stated: "[That a child's) pains must be endured for the peace and 
welfare of the family is something ofa mockery." Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 
472,482, 174 N.E.2d 718, 724, 112 N.Y.S.2d 234,245 (1961) (Fuld, J., dissenting). 
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scionably abused.32 The immunity should not be applied to shield a 
parent from liability when the parent has deserted his protective role by 
becoming a force from which the child needs to be protected.33 
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE IMMUNITY 
After the application of the parent-child tort immunity failed to 
further its stated objectives, many jurisdictions re-examined the immu-
nity they had previously embraced.34 These courts recognized the un-
conscionable result often reached when the immunity was applied, and 
they sought to effectuate the legal maxim that each man should bear 
responsibility for his own acts.35 In light of these factors, an increasing 
number of courts abrogated the immunity, and some courts restricted 
certain aspects of the bar against parent-child tort recovery.36 
Limitation of the immunity served a dual purpose in those juris-
dictions choosing to restrict rather than abrogate the immunity. By 
narrowing the scope of the immunity, the court could allow recovery 
when necessary to reach a just result and still invoke the immunity to 
protect other aspects of parental behavior.37 
Various methods were used to limit the immunity. Some courts 
restricted the immunity by limiting its application to those parties who 
were occupying a strictly defined parent-minor child relationship at the 
time of the tortious injury.38 Under this first approach, the immunity 
would not apply to a suit between a parent and an emancipated child39 
or between a parent and a child who were in an auxiliary relationship, 
such as an employer-employee relationship, at the time of the tortious 
32. Materese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 136, 131 A. 198,203 (1925). 
33. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,917-18,479 P.2d 648, 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 242 
(1971) (en banc). 
34. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 355, 339 N.E.2d 907, 911 (1975); Lee v. 
Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 724-26 (W. Va. 1976). The two cases that formed the 
vanguard in this area were Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930), and 
Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). See generally J. BATES, THE 
CHILD AND THE LAW 9 (1976); 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 940 (1979). 
35. Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 723 (W. Va. 1976). 
36. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Lee v. Comer, 224 
S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976). See generally Cooperrider, Child v. Parent in Tort: A 
Case for the Jury?, 43 MINN. L. REV. 73 (1958); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the 
Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Sanford]. For a list of 
states that have abrogated or restricted the immunity, see note 3 supra. 
37. Some states that have retained the immunity have allowed the child to maintain a 
suit in many situations. See Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) 
(child permitted to recover from adoptive parent); Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Supp. 
125, 110 A.2d 492 (1954) (child permitted to recover upon maintaining burden of 
proving emancipation); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952) 
(child permitted to recover for willful or malicious tort); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 
Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (child permitted to recover for outrageous tort); Cow-
gill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) (child permitted to recover for act 
of gross negligence). See generally Demise, supra note 19. 
38. See, e.g., Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 2d 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956). 
39. Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1956). 
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injury.40 Other courts restricted the immunity to certain types of tor-
tious behavior. Injury caused by behavior adjudged too unreasonable 
to be included within the immunity was freely actionable under this 
second approach.41 Other courts viewed the presence of liability insur-
ance as an extrinsic factor that eliminated the policy reasons for apply-
ing the immunity.42 
A. Restrictive Definition of the Parent-Child Relationship 
1. Emancipation of the Child 
When the parent's duty to support and govern ;:t child has termi-
nated, the correlative immunity is removed.43 The parental duty is le-
gally terminated when the child reaches the statutory age of majority; 
thereafter he is considered emancipated.44 An emancipated child is 
granted all the rights and responsibilities of adulthood, including the 
responsibility to provide for his own care and the right to pursue legal 
action in his own name. An emancipated child may pursue any tort 
action against a parent as long as the tort occurred after the child was 
emancipated.45 Several reasons have been set forth by the courts for 
refusing to allow an action by an emancipated child for a wrong in-
flicted upon him while he was still a minor. The courts have reasoned 
that an injury that would not have been actionable at the time it arose 
should be forever barred.46 Other courts have expressed that the likeli-
hood of fraud in this particular situation outweighs the probable bene-
fit to the parties.47 
2. Adoptive Parents and Persons Acting In Loco Parentis 
One of the presumptions that supports the parental privilege to 
discipline and the parental immunity is that the love of the natural par-
ent for his child acts as a check against child abuse.48 A minority of the 
40. See, e.g., Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). 
41. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955). 
42. E.g., Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972) (construing CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 52-572c (West Supp. 1982»; Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 723-35 
(W. Va. 1976). 
43. See Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 126, 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1956). 
44. There are five methods by which the disabilities of minority may be removed. 
These forms have been stated as occurring when (a) by written or oral agreement 
or some act the parent relinquishes parental control; (b) the parent abandons, 
neglects, or is cruel to the child; (c) the infant marries; (d) the child reaches an age 
when, by statutory authority, he is allowed to exercise the rights of majority; and 
(e) the child is enlisted in military service. 12 MD. L. REV. 201, 211 (1951). 
45. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 122. 
46. Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 648-49, 294 N.W. 33, 36 (1940); see Downs v. 
Poulin, 216 A.2d 29,34 (Me. 1966). See generally Domestic Relations, supra note 
28, at 1067. 
47. See, e.g., Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 114, 128 A.2d 617, 623 (1956); De-
mise, supra note 19, at 611. 
48. Burdick v. Nawrocki, 21 Conn. Supp. 272, 276, 154 A.2d 242, 246 (1959). See 
generally Torts, supra note 19, at 1041-43. 
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courts have refused to cloak the adoptive parent with the immunity's 
protection because they have assumed that the adoptive parent lacks 
the affection felt by the natural parent for the child.49 Other courts have 
excluded the surrogate parent based solely upon a lack of consanguin-
ity, regardless of the affection exhibited between adoptive parent and 
child.50 In the majority of cases, however, no distinction is made be-
tween natural and adoptive parents.51 When executing parental re-
sponsibilities, the adoptive parent is afforded the protection of the 
immunity. 52 
Teachers and others temporarily entrusted with the care of a child 
are considered to be acting in loco parentis, in the place of the parent, 
and are afforded the immunity's protection only to the extent that their 
behavior is within the scope of their authority. 53 Although shielded by 
the immunity from claims based upon negligence in the execution of an 
authorized act, the temporary guardian remains liable for acts of wilful 
misconduct, intentional tortious behavior, and negligence outside the 
scope of the guardian's authority.54 
3. Death of the Parent-Defendant 
When the parent is deceased at the time the child brings suit, the 
need to protect parental discretion disappears and the child is allowed 
to seek compensation. 55 The minority view, however, refuses to make 
the parent's death an exception to the immunity for two reasons. First, 
this exception would discriminate against similarly injured children 
wQ.ose parents are living.56 In addition, it is feared that the child's 
monetary recovery would financially deprive the surviving spouse and 
siblings. 57 
4. Auxiliary Relationships Between Parent and Child - The 
Business Exception 
When a child is injured by a parent's negligence in a business envi-
49. Demise, supra note 19, at 613; see, e.g., Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 420, 129 
S.W.2d 245, 247-48 (1939). 
50. E.g., Burdick v. Nawrocki, 21 Conn. Supp. 272, 154 A.2d 242 (1959); see Demise, 
supra note 19, at 613. 
51. Torts, supra note 19, at 1042; see REEVE, supra note 7, at 420-21 (those acting in 
loco parentis specifically included within the parental privilege); Demise, supra 
note 19, at 613 n.8. 
52. See PROSSER, supra note 3, § 122; Demise, supra note 19, at 613. 
53. See PROSSER, supra note 3, § 122. 
54. Id; see, e.g., Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964). 
55. The policy reasons for denying a cause of action usually die with the relationship. 
Barnwell v. Cordle, 438 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying Georgia law); Krause 
v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 666, 112 N.W.2d 134 (1962); see Davis v. 
Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (applying Pennsylvania law); Lasecki v. 
Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940). See generally Torts, supra note 19. 
56. See, e.g., Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29, 34 (Me. 1966). 
57. E.g., Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 651, 294 N.W. 33, 38 (1940). 
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ronment, the child is usually permitted to seek recovery. 58 This is re-
ferred to as the business exception and may be applied in two 
situations. 59 First, if a child is negligently injured while visiting a par-
ent who is working within the scope of his employment, the child may 
seek recovery from the parent's employer.6o The second situation oc-
curs when the child is employed by the parent and is injured by the 
parent's negligence during work. This child may bring an action 
against the parent-employer.61 The courts presented with the latter sit-
uation allow the child's claim by focusing upon the employer-employee 
rather than the parent-child aspect of the parties' relationship and, 
therefore, hold the parent-child tort immunity to be inapplicable.62 
The application of the business exception is often based upon the 
presence of the employer's business insurance63 and the same justifica-
tions for allowing automobile negligence claims between parent and 
child in the presence of liability insurance apply.64 Additionally, be-
cause the injurious act is unrelated to the parental role, the claim is 
unlikely to jeopardize any of the immunity's objectives.65 The advan-
tages of applying this exception are diminished, however, when the em-
ployer is allowed to seek contribution from the negligent parent for the 
injured child's monetary recovery.66 If the employer is successful in 
this claim, the employer's liability for the total award is decreased by 
the amount proportional to the parent's negligence in causing the in-
jury.67 Some courts that do not allow the child's tort claim directly 
58. Eg., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Dunlap v. Dun-
lap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 
743 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). The court in Dunlap 
used three factors to justify this exception to the immunity: (I) the injury arose 
from tortious conduct in a business environment; (2) the parent would not be 
forced to decrease family funds to compensate the child because the business own-
er possessed insurance that indemnified the business for injuries to or injuries 
caused by employees; and (3) the child was present at the place of business pri-
marily to provide labor. 84 N.H. at 354-56, 150 A. at 906-07. 
59. See, e.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Borst v. 
Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). 
60. Eg., Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 
W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). 
61. Eg., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, ISO A. 905 (1930). 
62. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 571, 103 N.E.2d 743, 747 (1952); Demise, supra 
note 19, at 610. 
63. Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); see Dunlap v. Dun-
lap, 84 N.H. 352, 359-64, 150 A. 905, 911-15 (1930). But see Barlow v. Iblings, 261 
Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968) (son injured in father's restaurant; recovery re-
fused although insurance was present). 
64. See text accompanying notes 91, 95-105 infra. 
65. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 359-64, 150 A. 905, 911-15 (1930). 
66. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 151-53, 282 N.E.2d 288, 296-98, 331 
N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-94 (1972). See also Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. I, 
403 A.2d 379 (1979). 
67. For a discussion of the repercussions of this type of third-party claim, see 
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 44-47, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346-48, 364 N.Y.S.2d 
859, 868 (1974) (dissenting opinion). 
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against the parent also forbid the employer from seeking contribution 
from the parent.68 
B. Characterization 0/ the Tort Action 
The term "emancipation," as previously discussed, refers to an ex-
ception to the immunity which allows a child to bring suit against a 
parent when the child has attained the statutory age of majority.69 
Many courts have used this same term to describe quite a different ex-
ception to the immunity, one that is caused by the parent's termination 
of the parent-child relationship by tortious behavior which exemplifies 
the parent's failure to protect and provide for the child.70 The degree 
of parental malfeasance and the type of tortious behavior that will trig-
ger a parent's liability has varied from "complete abandonment of the 
parental role" by the commission of an outrageous tort 71 to tem~orary 
"abdication of parental responsibility" by wilful misconduct. 2 Al-
though cruel behavior was initially required to emancipate the child in 
this manner, presently the commission of any intentional tort is consid-
ered sufficient by some courts to remove the immunity.73 The three 
cases that highlight the range of tortious behavior removing the immu-
nity are Mahnke v. Moore,74 Wright v. Wright,75 and Hoffman v. 
Tracy. 76 
In the 1951 case of Mahnke v. Moore,77 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland allowed a minor child to maintain a cause of action for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. In this case, the tort arose 
when Moore shot the child's mother and then committed suicide in the 
presence of his child.78 The court, in its first limitation upon parent-
child tort immunity, refused to protect this parental behavior from ju-
dicial scrutiny.79 Mahnke established that a child may maintain an ac-
68. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1,403 A.2d 379 (1979). 
69. See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra. 
70. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Lucas v. Maryland Drydock 
Co., 182 Md. 54, 31 A.2d 637 (1943). 
71. See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). 
72. This was the standard applied in Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 
(1965). 
73. Demise, supra note 19, at 611-12; see, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 
P.2d 218 (1955); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 
(1966). 
74. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). 
75. 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952). 
76. 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965). 
77. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). 
78. Id. at 63, 77 A.2d at 924. 
79. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926. The child in Mahnke was afforded the right to bring an 
action against her parent because the parent had abandoned the parental role of 
protecting the child. In a similar situation involving a wife's claim against a hus-
band, the husband forfeited his spousal immunity when he committed an outra-
geous tort against his wife. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 336-41, 390 A.2d 77,79-
83 (1978). In Lusby, the court held that the outrageousness of the husband's acts 
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tion against a parent for an outrageous act that refutes the existence of 
a parent -child relationship. 80 
One year after the Mahnke decision, the Court of Appeals of 
Georgia, in Wright v. Wright, 81 prohibited the application of the immu-
nity when a parent's act was "wilful and malicious."82 In Wright, the 
court allowed a child to recover damages for injuries resulting when the 
child was a passenger in an automobile driven by his intoxicated parent 
at excessive speeds.83 The parent's act was considered "wilful and ma-
licious" and was deemed sufficiently egregious to remove the 
immunity.84 
By labeling reckless, drunken driving an intentional act, Wright 
obfuscated the standards of negligent and intentional tortious behavior 
that would allow a child to pursue his cause of action.85 Other courts, 
unwilling to allow recovery in a claim based upon any degree of negli-
gence and fearing that such a ruling would transform slight acts of neg-
ligence, inevitable in a family environment, into potential causes of 
action, labeled such acts of gross negligence "wilful misconduct" and 
allowed the cause of action. 86 
The basis for an action founded upon gross negligence was ex-
plored by the Supreme Court of Washington in the 1965 case of Hoff-
constituted an abandonment of the marital relationship. Id at 337, 390 A.2d at 
80. Upon abandoning the relationship, the corresponding privilege of spousal im-
munity is forfeited. For a discussion of the reasons that support abrogation of the 
interspousal immunity, see 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 584, 596-97 (1979). 
80. The Mahnke court never defined the tort injury as intentional, but described the 
defendant's behavior as wanton and malicious. Subsequent Maryland cases have 
limited the application of the Mahnke exception to intentional acts. See Shell Oil 
Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1,403 A.2d 379 (1979); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 
720,272 A.2d 435, cert. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971). 
81. 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952). 
82. The court expressed this view by stating: 
[A] parent shall be liable for a wilful or malicious wrong against an un-
emancipated minor child who is living with such parent and under his 
custody and control if the wrong is such an act as would authorize a 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction depriving the parent of 
parental power over the child. 
Id at 723, 70 S.E.2d at 155. 
83. Id at 722-24, 70 S.E.2d at 153-55. The required degree of parental malfeasance 
was much less in Wright than in Mahnke. In Wright, the child met his burden of 
proving emancipation by demonstrating that his parent had vacated the protective 
parental role. The significance of this difference becomes more apparent when the 
extremely abusive acts necessary for a Mahnke exception are compared with those 
acts required under Wright. 
84. "Malicious" is used in this situation to describe behavior that does not exhibit 
malice in its legal or general sense. A court's classification of behavior as mali-
cious allows a child-plaintiff to pursue a cause of action whereas classification of 
this same act as one of gross negligence would, due to prevailing policy reasons, 
preclude the suit. For a discussion of the distinction between wilful and grossly 
negligent conduct, see Demise, supra note 19, at 611-12. 
85. 85 Ga. App. 721, 722-24, 70 S.E.2d 152, 153-55 (1952). 
86. See Demise, supra note 19, at 611-12. 
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man v. Tracy. 87 In a factual setting similar to Wright, 88 the court 
decided that an intoxicated parent who drove her automobile with her 
child as a passenger abdicated the parental role. The child was there-
fore free to pursue civil damages against the £arent.89 Gross negli-
gence, although not labeled as such by the court, 0 became a ground for 
removing the immunity. 
C The Presence of Insurance 
Aware of the prevalent use of automobile liability insurance, the 
courts were faced with a great conflict in applying the immunity to au-
tomobile injury cases between parent and child. If the court barred the 
child's claim, the family would be burdened with the cost of the child's 
medical care even though a parent had purchased insurance to com-
pensate any victim of his negligence. If, on the other hand, the child's 
claim against the negligent parent were successful, the parent's insurer 
would compensate the child, and the resources that would otherwise be 
diverted for the child's medical expenses would be protected.91 Never-
theless, it was difficult for the courts to justify allowing an action 
against an insured parent negligently operating an automobile while 
barring a child's claim against a parent for domestic negligence. 
In the early cases, the legal truism "insurance does not create lia-
bility" was invoked to bar consideration of the presence ofinsurance.92 
This approach was founded upon a gross misunderstanding of the in-
terplay between the purpose of the immunity, tort liability, and the role 
of insurance. The immunity was never based on the lack of a parent's 
liability for his child's injury, but was founded upon the public policy 
87.67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965). 
88. Both Hoffman and Wright involved the actions of an intoxicated driver. For a 
discussion of the tort as one of gross negligence, see Demise, supra note 19, at 611-
12. 
89. 67 Wash. 2d 31, 35-36, 406 P.2d 323, 326-27 (1965). 
90. The court interpreted the parent's failure to take precautions against resulting in-
jury to be an act of intent. Id at 35, 406 P.2d at 327. See Demise, supra note 19, 
at 611-12. This abandonment need not be total, as in Mahnke, but must demon-
strate that the injurious behavior was inconsistent with the parent's obligation to 
protect the child. See Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952). 
But if. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964) (court refused to 
create an exception for gross negligence because the father's behavior did not 
demonstrate a cruel or wicked intent). 
91. Smith v. Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971); see Immer v. Risko, 56 
N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970). In Immer, the court noted, "Domestic harmony 
may be more threatened by denying a cause of action than by permitting one 
where there is insurance coverage." Id at 489-90, 267 A.2d at 485. For a discus-
sion of the effect of liability insurance on the immunity, see Lee v. Comer, 224 
S.E.2d 721, 723-25 (W. Va. 1976); Casey, supra note 3, at 324-28. 
92. Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 483, 13 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1938); James, Accident 
Liability Reconsidered' The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 553 
(1948) [hereinafter cited as James]; see, e.g., Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 
(Ky. 1954); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964). 
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of protecting the family from internal strife.93 By providing a means of 
compensating the injured child without straining family resources, in-
surance furthers the immunity's policy objectives without denying the 
child recovery.94 
The presence of insurance in a parent-child tort claim caused 
many courts to restrict the immunity. Some courts chose to view the 
insurer, not the parent, as the defendant and held that the immunity 
did not apply.95 In these cases, recovery was often restricted to the ex-
tent of insurance coverage96 because allowing additional recovery 
would render the parent liable for the excess. Other courts that remove 
the immunity when automobile insurance is present have based their 
decisions on different factors. In Gelbman v. Gelbman,97 the Court of 
Appeals of New York noted that automobile insurance was compulsory 
in that state98 and ruled that intra-family claims arising out of an auto-
mobile accident caused by a family member's negligence were actiona-
ble. In Goller v. White, 99 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin allowed an 
action between parent and child for an injury that arose from an auto-
mobile accident because driving was not viewed to be an act specific to 
the parent-child relationship.loo The court abrogated the immunity for 
all claims between parent and child except those that alleged negli-
gence in the parent's provision of food, medical care, and housing. 101 
Focusing upon the presence of automobile insurance, the court addi-
tionally noted that the insurance company rather than the parent as-
sumed the financial consequences of litigation and, therefore, the court 
permitted the child to recover. 102 Additionally, the Supreme Court of 
93. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 705, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891). 
94. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 358, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975). The stum-
bling block before the widespread recognition of the exception in the presence of 
insurance was that the nature of the tort involved in an automobile accident is 
negligence. A tort action based upon carelessness or an error in judgment in the 
course of the family relationship remains abhorrent in some jurisdictions. Cow-
gill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 297-98, 218 P.2d 445, 451-52 (1950); see Chaffin v. 
Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964); Demise, supra note 19, at 611. 
95. See Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); Casey, supra note 3, at 325-29. 
See generally Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Cooperrider, 
Child v. Parent in Tort: A Case/or the Jury?, 43 MINN. L. REV. 73 (1958); San-
ford, supra note 36. 
96. See, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311 
(5th Cir. 1966) (applying Georgia law), affd, 396 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1968). 
97. 23 N.Y.2d 434,245 N.E.2d 192,297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969). 
98. Maryland has a similar legislative enactment that requires all Maryland drivers to 
possess insurance or other proof of financial ability to compensate a victim of an 
automobile accident. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103(b)(I) (1977). 
99. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). 
100. Id. at 409, 122 N.W.2d at 198. Injuries caused by vehicular negligence have been 
held actionable based upon the rationale that driving is not an activity specific to 
the parent-child relationship. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 358-60, 339 
N.E.2d 907, 913-15 (1975). 
101. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 409, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963); see Demise, supra note 19, at 
615. 
102. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 408, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963). 
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Errors of Connecticut, in Ooms v. Ooms, 103 noting that the loss-spread-
ing function of liability insurance benefits the insured public, provided 
that the insured family member would not be excluded from this bene-
fit. 104 Connecticut created an exception to the immunity when insur-
ance was present but retained the immunity for all other intra-family 
tort actions.105 Regardless of the different rationales set forth by these 
courts, each succeeded in furthering the objectives of the immunity 
without denying any family member his right to a civil remedy. 
V. THE IMMUNITY IN MARYLAND 
A. Maryland Adopts the Parent-Child Tort Immunity 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the parent-child tort 
immunity in the 1930 case of Schneider v. Schneider. 106 The parent in 
Schneider, injured while a passenger in a car driven negligently by her 
eighteen-year-old son, brought suit against her son for monetary dam-
ages. In denying the mother's claim, the court placed great emphasis 
on case law from jurisdictions which had adopted the immunity and 
viewed recovery as abhorrent to the "purity of family relationships," 107 
even if the awarded damages would be furnished by the insurance 
company.108 The court based its decision to deny recovery upon two 
grounds. First, the court noted that a parent entrusted with the guardi-
anship of a child's financial interests should not be allowed to diminish 
his child's property. Second, due to a parent's influence over his child, 
a child may not have the independence necessary to protect his individ-
ual legal rights. 109 
In the 1937 case of Yost v. Yost, 110 the plaintiff-child alleged that 
the parent had failed to fulfill his statutory duty to provide adequate 
monetary support. The court of appeals, characterizing the suit as one 
brought by a minor child against his parent for the negligent exercise of 
his parental duty, held that the action fell squarely within the ambit of 
the immunity. III The court, however, distinguished behavior involving 
the exercise of parental duty and discretion, which would be protected 
103. 164 Conn. 48,316 A.2d 783 (1972). 
104. Id (construing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572c (West Supp. 1982». 
105. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572c (West Supp. 1982); see Ooms v. Ooms, 164 
Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972); Demise, supra note 19, at 613. 
106. 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). 
107.ld at 24, 152 A. at 500 (quoting P. SCHOULER, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
§ 223 (3d ed. 1882» ("Both natural and politic law, morality, and the precepts of 
revealed religion alike demand the preservation of this relation in its full strength 
and purity."); accord, Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 250, 163 A.2d 147, 150 
(1960). 
108. 160 Md. 18,22, 152 A. 498, 499 (1930). In 1930, the immunity had not yet been 
challenged extensively. See Torls, supra note 19, at 1056-72. 
109. 160 Md. 18,22-23, 152 A. 498, 499-500 (1930). 
110. 172 Md. 128, 190 A. 753 (1937). 
Ill. Id at 131, 190 A. at 756. 
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by the immunity, from overtly tortious behavior. 112 By making this 
distinction, Yost appeared to indicate that a child's claim founded upon 
a parent's intentional tort would be actionable. l13 Limiting the immu-
nity's protection to behavior that is "incident to the parental relation-
ship," the court, in dicta, suggested a standard that would be used by 
another jurisdiction to restrict the immunity thirty-one years later. 114 
B. Maryland Restricts the Immunity 
In Maryland, an emancipated child is allowed to bring suit" 5 
against a parent for all tort claims arising after the child has reached 
the statutory age of majority.116 After emancipation, the action be-
comes one between two adults, neither of whom bear the privilege or 
responsibility to control the other. l17 Maryland has not yet addressed 
whether an emancipated child may pursue an action based upon an 
injury occurring during minority. The majority of jurisdictions bar this 
action, reasoning that the child would not have been allowed to bring 
the action during minority and, therefore, should not be allowed to 
bring the action upon reaching majority. 118 The likelihood that a party 
would fraudulently allege an injury occurred during minority has been 
set forth as an additional reason for excluding this type of claim. I 19 
An additional form of emancipation allows a minor child who has 
been subjected to cruelty, neglect, or abandonment to bring an action 
against his parent. In the 1943 case of Lucas v. Maryland Drydock 
Co., 120 the Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that a parent 
who attempted to strangle his child had abdicated his parental role, lost 
his parental privileges, and in effect, emancipated the child. The court 
determined that a parent who tortiously subjected a child to cruelty, 
112. As the court in Yost stated: 
Id 
[S]uch an action as this cannot be maintained by or on behalf of a minor 
child, against its parent for nonfeasance as to the performance of moral 
duties of support, or for neglect. These acts, as distinguished from overt 
acts of tort, grow out of and pertain to the relation of parent and 
child. . . . [F]or such acts of passive negligence incident to the parental 
relation, there is no liability. 
113. Id This standard was applied in Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199,203,241 
N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968). 
114. See Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 203, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968). 
115. Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1956). 
116. Id Although the parent has the burden of proving the existence of the parent-
child relationship, the one who alleges emancipation has the burden of proving it. 
Holly v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 29 Md. App. 498, 506, 349 A.2d 670, 675 
(1975). 
117. Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 108, 128 A.2d 617, 618 (1956). 
118. E.g., Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Supp. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (1954); Nahas v. Noble, 77 
N.M. 139,420 P.2d 127 (1966); Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964); see 
Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 722 (W. Va. 1976); Torts, supra note 19, at 1072. 
119. Torts, supra note 19, at 1072-73. 
120. 182 Md. 54, 31 A.2d 637 (1943). 
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neglect, or abandonment could not rely upon the court to enforce the 
protection due him as a parent. Not only is a child free to pursue a 
civil remedy for tort injury arising after the parent's emancipating be-
havior but, in addition, a child is allowed to seek recovery for the very 
act that severed the relationship.121 
There is an inherent technical inconsistency, however, in allowing 
the victimized child to sue the parent for the very act that terminated 
the relationship. If a child emancipated by parental cruelty is governed 
by the same limitations that apply to a child emancipated by attaining 
majority,122 then only those injuries occurring after emancipation 
would be actionable. At the time of the emancipating act, however, as 
well as at all times prior, the child is considered an unemancipated 
.minor and consistent application of the immunity would prohibit the 
child from bringing this initial action. To permit the action and to rec-
oncile this apparent inconsistency between the judicial treatment of 
these two forms of emancipation, the child should be considered eman-
cipated immediately prior to the time of the injurious act. 
In 1951, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Mahnke v. Moore 123 
declared that the father-defendant's act was "outrageous"124 and estab-
lished that a child injured by a tort within this category would be al-
lowed to pursue monetary recovery.125 The court began this hallmark 
decision by examining the three justifications for invoking the immu-
nity and determined that all were inapplicable. The facts of the case 
rendered the protection of family harmony and parental discretion in-
appropriate considerations. 126 In addition, a monetary award did not 
threaten to create !l disproportionate allotment of family resources to 
one family member because at the time of the action, no other family 
members were alive. 127 
The novel approach of the court in Mahnke, which examined 
whether barring the claim would further the objectives of the immu-
nity, had a pervasive effect upon subsequent courts' application of the 
immunity.128 Courts' adoption of this same analytic process resulted in 
exceptions to the immunity and foreshadowed the doctrine's abroga-
121. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64-66, 77 A.2d 923, 924-26 (1951). 
122. A child, upon reaching majority, is generally barred from bringing suit for an 
injury occurring during minority. Torts, supra note 19, at 1072. 
123. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). 
124. The court framed the issue as whether an illegitimate child could recover for per-
sonal injuries that resulted from the tortious acts of her father. Two prongs of this 
issue invited judicial determination: (I) whether an illegitimate child may sue her 
father despite the immunity; and (2) whether a child may maintain an action in 
tort when the parent's actions were outrageous. The court ignored the first ques-
tion and resolved the latter affirmatively. Id at 69, 77 A.2d at 926. 
125. Id at 69-70, 77 A.2d at 926-27. 
126. Id at 62, 77 A.2d at 924. 
127. Id 
128. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 355, 339 N.E.2d 907, 911-12 
(1975); Smith v. Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 185, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971). 
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tion in factual settings in which the policy reasons would no longer be 
furthered by the immunity's application. 129 
C Application of the Immunity After Mahnke 
In Sherhy v. Weather Brothers Transfer Co., 130 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied Maryland law and re-
fused a minor child's civil action against his father's employer. In 
Sherhy, a child sustained injuries when he was a passenger in a tractor-
trailer unit owned by Weather Brothers and Of era ted by the child's 
father in the course of the father's employment. 31 If a child may not 
maintain a tort action directly against his father, the court held, the 
child may not seek recovery from his father's employer for an injury 
caused by the father's negligence. In denying the child's claim, the 
court failed to employ the Mahnke approach but relied upon a section 
of the Mahnke opinion supporting the decision to deny the child's 
claim. 132 
Employing the analytical approach of Mahnke, Judge Butzner, in 
dissent, argued that the child's claim should have been allowed because 
the immunity's justifications were inapplicable in this case. 133 Judge 
Butzner reasoned that while the father was working within the scope of 
his employment, anyone harmed by the father's negligence would be 
compensated by the employer, who in tum would be reimbursed by his 
business insurance underwriter. The insurer would not be allowed to 
claim contribution from the father and, therefore, the suit would not 
disrupt family harmony or threaten family resources. The majority in 
Sherhy, as Judge Butzner additionally pointed out, ignored Maryland's 
strong policy of compensating innocent victims of a driver's 
negligence. 134 
129. When the Court of Appeals of New York, in Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 
434,245 N.E.2d 192,297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969), considered these policy reasons, it 
decided that the purpose sought would best be attained by abandoning the immu-
nity. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 
N.W.2d 193 (1963), reached the same conclusion. In Maryland, however, the test 
that the court of appeals established in Mahnke has never been applied in a later 
parent-child tort immunity case, even though the Mahnke dictum has been fre-
quently cited. See Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 224, 388 A.2d 568, 572 
(recovery denied despite the benefit the daughter would have received through her 
mother's insurance policy), cerl. denied, 283 Md. 736 (1978); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. 
App. 720, 726, 272 A.2d 435, 440 (father was denied recovery for injury sustained 
after wife was killed by the daughter's negligent driving), cerl. denied, 261 Md. 
726 (1971). 
130. 421 F.2d 1243 (4th Cir. 1970). 
131. Id. at 1244. 
132. Id. at 1245. 
133. Id. at 1247-48 (Butzner, J., dissenting). 
134. Id. at 1247 (Butzner, J., dissenting). As an illustration of the state's strong policy 
of compensating victims of negligent drivers, the Maryland legislature has estab-
lished the Uninsured Motorist Fund, MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H (1979), 
and has required that all Maryland drivers possess insurance or some other form 
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The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland first requested that the 
General Assembly abrogate the immunity in the 1971 case of Latz Y. 
Latz. 135 In Latz, a parent was killed while a passenger in an automo-
bile negligently driven by her minor child. Bound by the forty-year-old 
court of appeals' decision in Schneider Y. Schneider, 136 the court failed 
to make an exception in the presence of insurance and barred the plain-
tiff-parent from pursuing a wrongful death action against the child. 137 
The court deferred to the legislature, stating that it is "particularly 
fitting that any chanie in the parent-child immunity rule should be by 
legislative action."13 In the later case of Sanford Y. Sanford, 139 the 
court barred the minor child's claim for injuries sustained while a pas-
senger in a car driven negligently by his father. Because the defend-
ant's acts were not wanton or malicious, the court determined that the 
Mahnke exception was inapplicable. l40 
The court of special appeals had its first opportunity to allow a 
child's claim based upon alleged gross negligence in Montz Y •. 
Mendafojf 141 Although some jurisdictions have formed exceptions to 
the immunity for a claim alleging gross negligence or for actions arising 
from negligent driving,142 neither exception was adopted by this court. 
Montz deferred modification of the immunity to legislative action, de-
spite the court's recognition that the court in Latz had requested the 
legislature to remove the immunity seven years ago and the legislature 
had been silent. 143 
Chief Judge Gilbert, concurring, emphasized that the court, rather 
than the legislature, should abrogate the doctrine. l44 Referring to the 
of financial security to compensate the victims of negligent driving within Mary-
land.ld § 539; MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103 (1977 & Supp. 1982). 
135. 10 Md. App. 720, 727-28, 272 A.2d 435, 442, cert. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971). 
136. 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). In addition, Lau incorporated the portion of the 
Schneider opinion which stated that any reference to insurance policies· owned by 
either party would be irrelevant because the suit was not based upon an insurance 
policy. Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 728-29, 272 A.2d 435, 440, cerl. denied,261 
Md. 726 (1971). 
137. The court in Lalz failed to distinguish the circumstances in Schneider and did not 
note that the justifications for the Schneider decision, if valid in the 1930's, were 
no longer valid in 1971. If insurance was not prevalent during the time Schneider 
had been decided, the use of insurance was widespread by the time of the Lalz 
decision. Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 729 n.lO, 272 A.2d 435, 440 n.lO, cerl. 
denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971). For a discussion of the role of insurance in parent-
child tort immunity cases, see James, supra note 92. 
138. 10 Md. App. 720, 734, 272 A.2d 435, 442-43, cerl. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971). 
139. 15 Md. App. 390,290 A.2d 812 (1972). 
140. Id at 395, 290 A.2d at 814. 
141. 40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568, cerl. denied, 283 Md. 736 (1978). 
142. E.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421,289 P.2d 218 (1955); Wright v. Wright, 85 
Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio 5t. 2d 117, 
216 N.E.2d 375 (1966); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965). 
143. Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 223, 388 A.2d 568, 570, cert. denied, 283 
Md. 736 (1978). 
144. Chief Judge Gilbert stated: 
454 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 11 
immunity, he stated, "What some see as a doctrine of law that serves 
the best interest of family unity, ... I perceive to be an antiquated 
idea that not only fails to accomplish that end, but may well have the 
opposite effect .... "145 Chief Judge Gilbert also noted that Hewlett v. 
George 146 had been decided before the widespread use of automobiles 
and the prevalence of automobile liability insurance. 147 Actions arising 
from automobile injuries, therefore, could not have been considered by 
the Hewlett court, and recovery for these actions should not be pre-
cluded by the immunity.148 
In 1979, the court of special appeals refused to form a business or 
contractual exception to the immunity in Shell 011 Co. v. Ryckman. 149 
Unlike prior Maryland cases, however, the Ryckman decision benefited 
the family members involved in the litigation. Ryckman's son was in-
jured at the service station his father had leased from Shell Oil Com-
pany. The oil company offered to compensate the son for his injuries 
but sought indemnification from the boy's father. Ryckman success-
fully raised the defense of parental immunity to bar Shell's claim. 150 
Although some jurisdictions have carved an exception to the immunity 
for claims arising when the parent and child are engaged in a business 
activity, Maryland has never recognized this exception. lsl The court 
I think the time has come for the Court of Appeals to re-examine 
the parental immunity doctrine. . . . Perhaps, the Court will now hear 
the beat of a different drummer than that heard by its predecessors and 
march with those who have denounced Hew/ell, at least to the extent of 
permitting an unemancipated minor to recover in motor tort cases to the 
limits of his or her parents' automobile liability insurance for injuries 
occasioned to the minor as a result of the negligence of the parent. . . . 
The majority, in the case sub judice, opine that it is up "to the Maryland 
legislature to make this change [in the law] if it perceives it to be m the 
best interest of the people of this State." I fail to see why that is neces-
sarily true. . . . The promulgation of parental immunity from actions 
by unemancipated minors and its subsequent nutriment have been solely 
judicial functions. To me there is no valid reason why the branch of 
government that gave birth to the doctrine cannot lay it to rest. . . . 
Id. at 226-28, 388 A.2d at 572-73 (Gilbert, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
145. Id. at 226, 388 A.2d at 571 (Gilbert, c.J., concurring). 
146. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). 
147. Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 226 n.2, 388 A.2d 568, 572 n.2 (Gilbert, 
c.J., concurring), cerl. denied, 283 Md. 736 (1978). 
148. In examining the basis for the Hew/ell decision, he also criticized that court's con-
tention that an abused child was adequately protected by the state criminal code. 
This assumption, he concluded, revealed that the Mississippi court was ''unaware 
of the increasing number of child abuse cases appearing in the courts." Id. at 226 
n.3, 388 A.2d at 572 n.3 (Gilbert, c.J., concurring). 
149. 43 Md. App. 1,403 A.2d 379 (1979). 
150. Id. at 2-4, 403 A.2d at 380-81. 
151. This exception for tortious injuries which occur on business premises within the 
scope of the tort-feasor's employment has been established in many other jurisdic-
itons. E.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) (first case to estab-
lish this exception); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio S1. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst 
v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642,251 P.2d 149 (1952). See generally Demise, supra note 
19, at 609-10. 
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did not adopt Shell's allegation that the parent and child's employer-
employee relationship when the injury occurred barred application of 
the immunity.152 Additionally, Shell asserted that the parent impliedly 
waived the defense of parent-child tort immunity by agreeing, in an 
indemnification contract, to compensate Shell for any liability for in-
jury that occurred on the leased premises. 153 The court responded by 
stating that "any waiver of parental immunity must be expressly indi-
cated. Waiver of that immunity will not be 'presumed' or 'inferred' 
from broadly written, stock language indemnity provisions."154 This 
language indicates that the court would permit a parent or child to 
waive the immunity by express provision in all contracts. 155 
The Ryckman court, by applying the immunity, relieved the father 
of his contractual obligation to indemnify the company for its mone-
tary settlement with his son.156 Voicing dissatisfaction with the immu-
nity but deferring abrogation to the legislature, the court stated, "Had 
we been free to digress from the rigidity of Schneider, we would have 
readily done so in Montz as indicated by Chief Judge Gilbert's compel-
ling reasoning."157 
In summary, the court of special appeals has expressed a willing-
152. The facts of Ryckman would not have warranted this exception, even in those 
jurisdictions which have recognized the business exception, because the child was 
not on the premises primarily to provide labor. When the parent is the employer, 
this is a prerequisite of the exception. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354-56, 150 
A. 905, 906-07 (1930). For the list of the three factors which justify this exception 
to the immunity, see discussion of Dunlap at note 58 supra. The injured child in 
Ryckman was on the business premises merely to visit his father. 43 Md. App. 1, 
2,403 A.2d 379, 379 (1979). 
153. 43 Md. App. 1, 11,403 A.2d 379, 387 (1979). As an additional basis for making an 
exception to the immunity under the facts of the case, Shell suggested that the 
court extend the Mahnke exception to the business activities of a child. 
154. Id. at 8, 403 A.2d at 383-84. The court stated that Maryland law does not permit a 
parent to waive the parent-child tort immunity by contract, but modified this 
holding by stating that no implied waiver of the lIDmunity may be created by 
contract. Id. 
155. Id. In order to allow recovery between parent and child when insurance exists, 
the Ryckman court indicated that the provisions of the contract must form an 
express contractual waiver. Although this was never mentioned in any preceding 
Maryland opinion on parent-child tort immunity, the court of special appeals 
stated, "We touched upon the question of what is sufficient to indicate a contrac-
tual waiver of that immunity in MonIZ v. Mendalqlf In light of Schneider v. 
Schneider, we declined to hold that a parent who contracts to insure against her 
negligence negated the immunity rule by so doing." Id. at 6, 403 A.2d at 383 
(citations omitted). 
156. The court queried: 
If we cannot infer that when one contracts to protect all the world from 
his negligence, he did intend to protect his own children, . . . then can 
we properly infer that a parent who broadly contracts to indemnify a 
landlord "against all claims . . . on account of injury" contemplated 
waiving his immunity so he could indemnify a landlord who might settle 
a claim with his son? 
Id. The court answered this question in the negative. 
157. Id. at 8, 403 A.2d at 384. 
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ness to consider an exception for gross negligence,158 for injuries occur-
ring within the scope of employment l59 and for injuries arising from 
automobile accidents.160 Maryland has recognized no other exceptions 
beyond those based upon the termination of the parent-child relation-
Ship,161 as established in Mahnke, and the appellate courts of Maryland 
await action by a legislature which has been silent on this issue since 
the judicial adoption of the immunity fifty-three years ago. 
VI. ABROGATING THE PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY 
A. Reasons Supporting Abrogation 
The parent-child tort immunity has been invoked to protect the 
parent tort-feasor from liability for intentional, grossly negligent, and 
negligent torts. Different policy reasons support abrogation of the im-
munity in each instance. 
1. Intentional Torts 
The application of the immunity to bar intentional tort actions 
shields the cruel parent and ignores the abused child. Rather than pre-
serve family harmony, the immunity acts to conceal intra-family bru-
tality.162 The harmonious family that the immunity aims to protect 
and preserve will not seek the court's assistance to resolve family dis-
putes. 163 In addition, if a family is truly harmonious, such torts would 
158. Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 224, 388 A.2d 568, 570-71, cerl. denied, 283 
Md. 736 (1978). The court of special appeals in MonIz indicated that although 
gross negligence may form a basis for an exception to the immunity, the court 
would not address the issue unless that degree of negligence was alleged through-
out the pleadings as the sole cause of injury. Id The degree of gross negligence 
sufficient to form an exception would probably resemble those acts defined as 
wilful misconduct in other jurisdictions, such as driving while intoxicated. See 
notes 81-86 and accompanying text supra. 
No exception has yet been formed for intentional torts that are more culpable 
than negligent injury but less outrageous than the behavior in Mahnke v. Moore, 
197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). Because of the standards established in Mahnke 
and in two earlier cases, Yost v. Yost, 127 Md. 128, 190 A. 753 (1937) and Schnei-
der v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930), the exceptions would probably be 
drawn only for the commission of intentional torts that do not faU within the 
scope of parental discretion to discipline. This would align Maryland's standards 
with those of the common law, which protected parental discretion within the 
execution of parental duties, including the duty to discipline the child. See notes 
7-9 and accompanying text supra. 
159. Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1,4,403 A.2d 379, 381 (1979). 
160. Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. 220, 226, 388 A.2d 568, 573, cerl. denied, 283 Md. 736 
(1978). 
161. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). Maryland courts appear to 
require that the parent threaten the child's welfare, and not merely fail to protect 
the child, in order to be excepted from the immunity. See, e.g., Latz v. Latz, 10 
Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435, cerl. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971). 
162. Torls, supra note 19, at 1062. 
163. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 357, 339 N.E.2d 907, 913 (1975); Balts v. 
Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 430, 142 N.W.2d 66, 80 (1966). 
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not occur. 
When the immunity is raised to bar the claim of a child injured by 
his parent, the immunity allows the parent to injure tortiously with im-
punity. The parental privilege, which preceded the Hewlett v. 
George 164 decision, secured the parent's right to punish his child mod-
erately but protected the child's right to be free from brutal treatment. 
Maryland should adopt the standards applied in common law pursuant 
to the parental privilege to govern. 
The creators of the immunity assumed that the criminal code 
would adequately protect the child from any serious harm intentionally 
caused by the parent. 165 As Chief Judge Gilbert noted in MonIz v. 
Mendalo.ff, 166 the widespread incidence of child abuse refutes the as-
sumption that the criminal justice system provides sufficient protection 
for the victimized child. 167 In addition, when the responsibility to re-
dress the injuries of an abused child is delegated to the criminal courts, 
a wide range of egregious behavior that does not constitute a criminal 
offense escapes judicial scrutiny. Likewise, criminal sanctions do not 
provide the monetary damages available to the child in a civil 
proceeding. 168 
2. Torts Involving Gross Negligence 
When the parent-child tort immunity is applied to acts of gross 
negligence, it allows the parent to disregard the well-being of the indi-
vidual most reliant upon his protection. The parent, charged with the 
duty of protecting the child, is held to a standard of care much lower 
than that required between total strangers. This result contravenes the 
legal principle imposing a higher standard of care upon a person owing 
a special duty to another. 169 
Some courts apply the immunity to bar all claims based on negli-
164. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). 
165. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 891 (1891). This reliance upon 
criminal sanctions has provoked criticism. Implicit within this reasoning is the 
belief that the child should endure, for the sake of family harmony, all personal 
injuries that are caused by conduct that is insufficiently egregious to form a crimi-
naloffense. See Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 226 n.3, 388 A.2d 568, 572 
n.3 (Gilbert, c.J., concurring), cert. denied, 283 Md. 736 (1978). 
166. 40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568, cert. denied, 283 Md. 736 (1978). 
167. Id at 226 n.3, 388 A.2d at 572 n.3 (Gilbert, C.J., concurring). 
168. See Cooperrider, Child v. Parent in Tort: A Case/or the Jury?, 43 MINN. L. REV. 
73, 85 (1958). Maryland has various procedures for removing a child from a 
home in which he has been criminally mistreated; however, none of these sanc-
tions require the parent to make restitution to the victimized child. E.g., MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 72A, §§ 5-8 (1977 & Supp. 1981); id. art. 27, § 35A (1977); MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 30-88 (Supp. 1981). For an illustration of the 
inadequacies of the present sanctions, because they fail to make restitution to the 
abused child, see McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); 
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). See generally Paulsen, The Legal 
Framework/or Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1966). 
169. See generally PROSSER, supra note 3, § 122. 
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gence,170 including gross negligence, 17 I reasoning that some degree of 
negligence in the family's daily life is inevitable.172 Currently in Mary-
land, an act of gross negligence will only be actionable if it reveals that 
a parent has abandoned his role as the child's protector, pursuant to the 
guidelines of Mahnke v. Moore. 173 Maryland should broaden the cur-
rent interpretation of the Mahnke exception to include all acts of gross 
negligence. A parent committing a grossly negligent act that injures his 
child demonstrates a sufficient disregard for a child's life to indicate an 
abandonment of the parental role. If application of the immunity en-
ables a parent to commit a grossly n<:gligent act with impunity, the dan-
ger posed to the family will outweigh the immunity's possible benefits. 
3. Negligent Torts 
It is difficult to reconcile the application of the immunity to negli-
gent tort actions with Maryland's constitutional guarantee which en-
ables each person to seek a remedy for any injury to person or 
property.174 Although the parent-child tort immunity has never been 
applied to bar an action between parent and child for negligent injury 
to property,175 when the negligence results in personal injury, the claim 
is barred by the immunity. 176 This unreasonable distinction, combined 
with the legal maxim that negligent conduct should result in the wrong-
170. When a claim involving a grossly negligent act that merits judicial inspection is 
presented, the court often chooses a synonym that describes the nature of the tort 
action but does not include the word negligence. Wilful misconduct, wanton mis-
conduct, and wanton recklessness are a few of the many terms that have been 
used. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965). See 
generally Demise, supra note 19, at 611-12; notes 81-86 and accompanying text 
supra. 
171. See, e.g., Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 299, 25 N.E.2d 766, 767 (1940). 
172. The English author, Charles Dickens, expressed the ubiquity of negligence: "Acci-
dents will occur in the best regulated families." C. DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 
396 (4th ed. 1925). 
173. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). See Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 224, 
388 A.2d 568,571, cert. denied, 283 Md. 736 (1978). 
174. Article 19 of the Maryland Constitution states: 
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, 
ought to have a remedy by the course of the Law of the Land, and ought 
to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, 
and speedily without delay, according to the Law of the Land. 
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19. 
175. Torts, supra note 19, at 531. 
176. This issue was examined by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Streenz v. Streenz, 
106 Ariz. 86, 89,471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970), in which the court queried, "Is it rea-
sonable to say that our law should protect the property and contract rights more 
zealously than the rights of his person?" Id. The court resolved the question in 
the negative. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Sorensen v. 
Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 356, 339 N.E.2d 907, 912 (1975), addressing the same 
issue, stated, "Children enjoy the same right to protection and to legal redress for 
wrongs done to them as others enjoy. Only the strongest reasons, grounded in 
public policy, can justify limitation or abolition of those rights." Id. 
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doer's liability,177 highlights the appropriateness of abrogating the 
immunity. 
The substitution of a parental defense in the area of negligence, 
however, may be warranted to protect the parent from two types of 
claims: the claim of a child injured by parental negligence in which the 
injurious act is not protected by insurance coverage; and a non-family 
member's claim that is founded upon a breach of duty owed by a par-
ent to a child. A child receiving the advantage of his parent's care 
should not be allowed to gain, at his parent's expense, from an incident 
of parental negligence. 178 Additionally, a modified defense should be 
retained to protect the parent from the claim of a non-family member 
seeking indemnification. 179 This type of action arises when the non-
family member seeks compensation from the parent and bases his 
claim on the parental negligence that was a factor in the non-family 
member's liability for damages awarded the child. 180 When a child 
would be barred from bringing a negligence claim against the parent 
that is founded on a breach of a parental duty, the third party should 
not be allowed to "stand in the child's shoes" to allege that the parent's 
177. Presidents & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 812 (D.C. 
Cir. 1942). In Hughes, Justice Rutledge stated, "We start with general principles. 
For negligent or tortious conduct liability is the rule. Immunity is the exception." 
Id. (referring to charitable immunity), quoted in Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 
723 (W. Va. 1976). 
178. See Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 250, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (1960). But see 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975). In Sorensen, the 
court stated: "[W]here the action is a true adversary one against a parent who 
refused to contribute sufficiently to the support of a child ... , judicial formula-
tion of an obstacle to the suit cannot contribute to family harmony .... " Id. at 
357, 339 N.E.2d at 913. 
179. Some jurisdictions that allow a child to bring a negligence claim against a parent 
for an injury arising from an automobile accident do not allow the child to bring a 
claim that is based upon the negligent execution of a parental duty. By virtue of 
this distinction, a third party is precluded from basing a claim upon any aspect of 
parental negligence that would not, by application of the immunity, be actionable 
by the child. This tangential benefit of the immunity is most useful in precluding 
the third party's recovery in a claim alleging negligent supervision. See Schneider 
v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 
(1963). 
If the child could sue his parent for a claim of negligent supervision, a third 
party could also raise such a claim. This would lead to an apportionment of dam-
ages and would consequently decrease the child's recovery. In Dole v. Dow 
Chern. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), the court 
allocated the damages from the parent and Dow Chemical Company in propor-
tion to the negligence each displayed. This produced the undesirable result of 
allowing an outsider the right to claim family funds. If the child received $ 10,000 
and $8,000 was to be paid by the non-family tort-feasor, the family's assets would 
have been diminished by $2,000. For a discussion of the disadvantages of al-
lowing third party claims for negligent supervision of a child, see Holodook v. 
Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). See also Stra-
hom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956) (immunity barred 
defendant's joinder of parent in child's tort action). 
180. Strahom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956). 
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duty has not been conscientiously executed. 181 Shell Oil Co. v. Ryck-
man 182 applied the immunity to bar the claim for indemnification be-
cause recovery, if allowed, would have indirectly taken funds from the 
parent to compensate the child, which the child could not have done 
directly. 183 
4. Negligent Torts in the Presence of Insurance 
Injuries arising from automobile accidents are the most frequent 
basis of intra-family tort claims. 184 The tort-feasor involved in these 
accidents is generally covered by liability insurance because insurance 
is often a prerequisite for obtaining a driver's license. 185 In Maryland, 
all licensed drivers must possess some form of liability insurance as 
proof of financial ability to compensate any victim of his negligent 
driving. 186 Maryland's public policy is to provide recovery for those 
injured by negligent driving within the state. 187 This policy has· been 
furthered by the General Assembly's provision for the establishment of 
a fund to compensate the victim of a driver who does not possess the 
requisite insurance, cannot be found, or is otherwise judgment proof. 188 
181. Id; see Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1, 403 A.2d 379 (1979). 
182. 43 Md. App. 1,403 A.2d 379 (1979). 
183. Id at 6-10, 403 A.2d at 383-86. 
184. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 355, 339 N.E.2d 907, 911-12 (1975); Lee v. 
Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 723-25 (W. Va. 1976); Torts, supra note 19, at 535. See 
generally Casey, supra note 3; Sanford, supra note 36. Very few courts, however, 
have agreed on the role of insurance in a negligence claim which involves the 
parent-child tort immunity. Torts, supra note 19, at 545-50. See generally Flem-
ing, Accident Liability Reconsidered' The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE 
L.J. 549 (1948). 
The role of automobile liability insurance in general is to spread the potential 
loss one driver may incur among all those who engage in the same activity. By 
this method, no driver is financially ruined by the liability he incurred in negli-
gently injuring another nor is the victim denied compensation. 1 J. JOYCE, INSUR-
ANCE 94 (2d ed. 1917). 
185. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 196, 297 N.Y.S.2d 
529, 534 (1969); see, e.g., Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 
(1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 655, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 
297 (1971) (en banc); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975). 
The court in Sorensen stated, "[W]e take judicial notice of the widespread exist-
ence of automobile liability insurance. . . . [I]t remains. . . a proper element in 
a discussion of the public policy supporting abrogation of parental immunity." Id 
at 356, 339 N.E.2d at 914. 
In Smith v. Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 185, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971), the court 
stated, "The very high incidence of liability insurance covering Virginia-based 
motor vehicles, together with the mandatory uninsured motorist endorsements to 
insurance policies, has made our rule of parental immunity anachronistic when 
applied to automobile accident litigation." Id 
186. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103 (1977). 
187. Sherby v. Weather Bros. Transfer Co., 421 F.2d 1243, 1247 (4th Cir. 1970) 
(Butzner, J., dissenting); see, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H (1979 & Supp. 
1981); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103 (1979 & Supp. 1981). 
188. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103 (1979). Maryland has assured that every 
driver on a Maryland road may recover up to $20,000. Id This provision requires 
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Despite the Maryland legislature's efforts to insure adequate recovery 
for accident victims, the victim who is the parent or child of the negli-
gent driver is denied recovery, due to the application of the parent-
child tort immunity.189 The insurance underwriter providing the de-
fense for the negligent parent or child invokes the immunity and, thus, 
protects the assets of the insurance company at the expense of a fam-
ily's resources. 
An objection to allowing a child's action against an insured parent 
has been that this exception to the immunity establishes liability based 
upon the presence of insurance. 190 This view misinterprets the inter-
play between the purpose of the immunity, tort liability, and the role of 
insurance. The presence of insurance, irrelevant to the culpability of 
the defendant, is fundamentally relevant to the application of the im-
munity.191 Specifically, application of the immunity prevents the diver-
sion of family funds to pay a court judgment. 192 Insurance coverage 
provides an auxiliary source of funds to compensate the injured family 
member and, therefore, furthers the objectives of the immunity without 
denying the family member's recovery.193 In this situation, the immu-
nity's invocation would present unnecessary hardship without provid-
ing the family a corresponding benefit. 194 
Independent of forming this exception to the immunity, a method 
to remove this family penalty in automobile negligence actions was re-
vealed in Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman. 195 The court suggested that a par-
ent may contractually waive his parental immunity if the waiver is 
express and its terms are precise. 196 If implemented, this guideline 
would allow a parent, upon including an express provision within his 
each applicant for a Maryland driver's license to possess this minimum amount of 
security to be paid to victims of his negligence. If the driver is insolvent, the 
victim can claim directly from the insurance company. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, 
§ 481 (1979). If the driver has no insurance, the victim can file a claim with the 
Maryland Uninsured Motorist Fund. fd. § 539. 
189. Injured victims who are barred from prosecuting their claims due to an immunity 
do not appear to be able to recover under the Uninsured Motorist Fund, nor from 
the insurance company directly. Article 48A of the Maryland Annotated Code 
provides that claims can only be made against the Uninsured Motorist Fund or 
directly against the insurer if the injured party (claimant) has a cause of action 
against the owner or operator of the vehicle. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, 
§ 243H(a)(I)(iii) (1979). 
190. Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480,483, 13 N.E.2d 438, 441 (1938). 
191. Torts, supra note 19, at 545. 
192. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88,471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970). 
193. fd. 
194. fd. at 87, 471 P.2d at 283. An additional basis for allowing recovery in the pres-
ence of insurance is that it would be unconscionable to allow the insurer of the 
one possessing the immunity to receive premium payments from the insured and 
refuse to pay any claims against the insured by invoking the insured's immunity. 
q: Cox v. Dejarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664, 671-75, 123 S.E.2d 16, 21-24 (1964) 
(referring to charitable immunity). 
195. 43 Md. App. I, 403 A.2d 379 (1979). 
196. fd. at 9, 403 A.2d at 383-84. 
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insurance policy, to preclude the insurer's invocation of the parent-
. child tort immunity to bar the child's recovery. This, however, may 
prove to be an impractical alternative. The insurance contract is gener-
ally an adhesion contract197 and, therefore, is not customarily subject to 
wide variance in its terms; each provision is not negotiated. 198 In the 
normal course of obtaining insurance coverage, the general public does 
not determine which potential victims the insurer will compensate. 
The activity, such as operating a motor vehicle, is identified 199 and all 
victims of the insured party's negligence while engaging in this activity 
will be compensated by the insurance underwriter. 200 
B. Establishing a Parental Defense 
In order to insure that the original objectives of the parent-child 
tort immunity were not abandoned when the doctrine was removed, 
some courts abrogating the immunity have established a narrow paren-
tal defense to protect the parent who has committed an isolated act of 
negligence.201 Three de(enses to parent-child tort claims have been es-
tablished, each barring a claim in one of the following areas: claims 
based upon negligent exercise of a parental duty;202 claims in which the 
injurious behavior involved a family activity;203 and claims against a 
parent who acted as a reasonably prudent parent.204 In addition, some 
courts have chosen to abrogate the immunity without establishing a 
defense that may later prove to be too rigid.205 These courts have de-
cided to consider each claim on a case-by-case basis.206 
In the 1963 case of Goller v. White, 207 Wisconsin became the first 
state to abrogate the immunity and to establish a limited parental de-
197. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281,1284-85 (Alaska 1979); W. VANCE, VANCE ON INSUR-
ANCE 243 (3d ed. 1951). Vance defined the term as follows: 
Id 
[T)he terms of the contract do not result from mutual negotiation and 
concessions of the parties and so do not truly express a~ agreement at 
which they have arrived. Rather most of the terms are fixed in accord-
ance with a form prescribed by the insurer, or even by statute, to which 
the insured may "adhere" if he chooses, but which he cannot change. 
198. W. VANCE, VANCE ON INSURANCE 45, 241 (3d ed. 1951). 
199. The practice of insuring a driver for his potential liability to another arose from 
the maritime practice of insuring all ship captains against loss of their cargo at 
sea. Id at 8. 
200. Id at 53. 
201. E.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en 
banc); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Goller v. 
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). 
202. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). 
203. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199,241 N.E.2d 12 (1968). 
204. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc). 
205. E.g., Gelbman v. Ge1bman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 
(1969); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976). 
206. Ge1bman v. Ge1bman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 442, 245 N.E.2d 192, 199, 297 N.Y.S.2d 
529, 537 (1969); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 733 (W. Va. 1976). 
207. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). 
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fense. 208 The court held that a child's claim alleging the negligent exe-
cution of a parental duty could not be pursued.209 Specifically, a claim 
founded upon negligence in the parent's provision of clothing, housing, 
or health care would be barred by this defense.21o 
The Goller guideline, however, was criticized as being difficult to 
apply precisely and consistently because the scope of the duties owed to 
the child evade exact description.211 For example, a claim of injury 
resulting from a broken stair in the home would be barred by the Gol-
ler defense, although an injury caused by a negligent car repair would 
not clearly lie within Goller's boundaries. In a later 'case, this same 
court, attempting to clarify the scope of the Goller defense, ruled that a 
child's claim founded upon a parent's negligent warnings or instruc-
tions is a challenge to parental discretion which, under Goller, must be 
barred.212 
The Illinois Court of Appeals, in Schenk v. Schenk,213 sought to 
abrogate the immunity and substitute a parental defense that would 
protect the lifestyle of the family. The Schenk court held that all tort 
actions between parent and child would be allowed except those in 
which the injury arose from a family activity.214 Claims that involved 
injuries arising from automobile accidents, even if the automobile was 
being used for a family excursion, were specifically held to be 
actionable.215 
To prevent a parent from escaping liability for the negligence he 
commits within the family context, the Supreme Court of California 
advanced the "reasonable parent test" in Gibson v. Gibson. 216 Although 
the Gibson court effectively eliminated the situation in which a child 
208. Noting that contract and property actions between parent and child were unquali-
fiedly allowed without ill effect upon the family and that the widespread use of 
liability insurance removed the threat of financial hardship, the court held that 
each of the policy reasons for invoking the immunity was inapplicable. Id at 411-
15, 122 N.W.2d at 200-04. 
209. Goller established that parental liability would be the rule and an immunity, in 
the form of a narrow parental privilege, would be the exception. See 1964 WIS. L. 
REv. 714. 
210. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 408-10, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198-99 (1963). 
211. For a criticism of the Goller guideline, see Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922-
23, 479 P.2d 648, 652-53, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292-93 (1971) (en banc). See also 
Demise, supra note 19, at 615-17. 
212. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 81-83, 158 N.W.2d 341, 345-47 (1968). 
213. 100 Ill. App. 2d 199,241 N.E.2d 12 (1968). 
214. Id at 202, 241 N.E.2d at 15. The court allowed the father to pursue a cause of 
action based on negligence because no family relationship or purpose resulted in 
the father's injury. Id 
215. Id at 204, 241 N.E.2d at 16. 
216. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc). Gibson stated that 
"although a parent has the prerogative and the duty to exercise authority over his 
minor child, this prerogative must:be exercised within reasonable limits." Id at 
917,479 P.2d at 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. This guideline is very similar to the 
common law parental privilege to govern. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text 
supra. 
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suffered tort injury without having legal recourse against the parent, 
this approach is of dubious value. 217 In effect, the Gibson approach 
would subject each negligence claim to a preliminary judicial determi-
nation of whether a parent's behavior is that of a reasonable, prudent 
parent.218 It is not clear from the Gibson opinion whether the reason-
ably prudent parent is more or less responsible than the reasonably 
prudent person. 
C Effect of Abrogation on the Insurance Underwriters 
In those jurisdictions that have removed the immunity, some in-
surance companies have responded by including clauses within their 
policies that exclude recovery by any family member living in the same 
household as the insured.219 Because this clause could bar the recovery 
of the spouse, siblings, and other relatives, as well as the parent and 
child, its effect upon the family member's recovery is much broader 
than the scope of the parent-child tort immunity. If the immunity in 
Maryland is modified to allow tortious injury claims between parent 
and child, the policy reasons supporting recovery should be invoked to 
prohibit this type of exclusionary clause.22o 
Upon removing the parent-child tort immunity, it is inevitable that 
the cost of automobile liability insurance will increase to some extent to 
absorb the additional recovery of the parent or child plaintiff. If, due 
to the inability of the insurer to defend against an intra-family claim, 
these suits become the source of frequent inordinately large awards, 
then liability premiums for all members of the insured public will 
greatly increase.221 The interests of persons purchasing insurance 
therefore coincide with the interests of the insurance underwriter in 
seeking a fair trial and preventing the unjust enrichment of the family 
plaintiff. 222 
An insurance underwriter may experience three problems in de-
217. Demise, supra note 19, at 615-17. 
218. If the reasonable parent is held to a more lenient standard than the reasonable 
person, the parent may act negligently and with impunity to the extent of the 
difference in the two standards. This result, however, would frustrate the Gibson 
court's stated intent. If the reasonable parent is viewed to be more responsible 
than the reasonable person, then the preliminary determination that the child may 
bring this cause of action would be dispositive of the parent's culpability at trial. 
For a discussion of some additional ramifications of the Gibson standard, see De-
mise, supra note 19, at 617-18. 
219. A sample clause reads, "This policy does not apply to bodily injury to any person 
who is related by blood, marriage or adoption to an insured against whom claim 
is made if such person resides in the same household as such insured." Casey, 
supra note 3, at 331. 
220. The Insurance Commissioner of Maryland has the final authority to approve or 
disapprove the provisions within each insurance policy of all insurance underwrit-
ers operating in Maryland and may allow or prohibit exclusionary clauses. MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 376 (1979). 
221. Casey, supra note 3, at 329. 
222. Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 725-26 CW. Va. 1976), Casey, supra note 3, at 329. 
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fending an intra-family tort claim. First, the insurer may not receive 
the necessary cooperation from a family defendant in providing ade-
quate information for the insured's defense. 223 Second, a defendant 
family member in a jury trial may be too helpful to the plaintiff family 
member and may prejudice the jury by his statements.224 Third, if 
aware that the insurer and not the defendant family member will fur-
nish the funds, a jury may be unduly influenced to award an unjustifi-
ably large recoveryYs Several solutions to each of these problems 
have been proposed.226 In response to the first problem the insured's 
cooperation in the defense of a claim against him is often a contractual 
prerequisite of the underwriter's duty to indemnify the defendant.227 
When the family member's failure to cooperate has materially 
prejudiced the insured's defense, the insurer is not obligated to indem-
nify the defendant for any damages awarded to the plaintiff. 228 
If it becomes apparent that the defendant may offer statements 
that will unfavorably influence the jury, the insurer should be allowed 
to inform the jury that due to the relationship between the parties, 
plaintiff and defendant may both be in favor of the plaintiffs recov-
ery.229 Upon the insurer's request, the jury should be instructed that 
the testimony of the defendant concerning the circumstances of the ac-
cident must be received with great caution. A jury instruction similar 
to the cautionary instruction administered in a criminal trial when the 
uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator is in evidence may prove 
helpful. 230 As another alternative, the insurer should also be allowed to 
elicit testimony from the family member defendant in the manner re-
served for hostile witnesses.231 These procedures may mitigate the pos-
sibility of collusion. 232 
In addition, the insurer should be allowed to defend the suit in its 
223. Comment, Intraj'amily Tort Immunity in Virginia: A Doctrine in Decline, 21 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 273, 302 (1979). 
224. Id 
225. Casey, supra note 3, at 330. 
226. Id at 329-36. 
227. Id at 332. 
228. Cabrera v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 44 Misc. 2d 598, 603, 254 N.Y.S.2d 496, 500 
(1964) .(when lack of cooperation is prejudicial to the outcome of the trial, the 
insurance company is relieved of its obligation to defend or indemnify the in-
sured). The insurer can thus avoid relying upon an insured who may offer unfa-
vorable testimony. See a/so Goldberg v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 279 Mass. 
393, 188 N.E. 235 (1933) (insured defendant's repeated disappearances from 
courtroom in the midst of his trial relieved insurance company of its obligation to 
defend him). 
229. Comment, Intraj'amily Tort Immunity in Virginia: A Doctrine in Decline, 21 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 273, 303 (1979). 
230. Id 
231. This would allow the insurer to cross-examine the insured. Cross-examination is 
reserved for an adverse witness or a hostile party. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 25, at 52 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). 
232. Casey, supra note 3, at 332. 
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own name when the cooperation between plaintiff and defendant fam-
ily members jeopardizes the adversarial nature of the trial. The jury's 
knowledge that the underwriter, not the individual defendant, will be 
responsible for paying the damages awarded to the plaintiff may result 
in larger verdicts against the insurer. In automobile accident claims, 
however, the jury may already have assumed that the insurer is provid-
ing the recovery?33 Nevertheless, a jury should be reminded that an 
unjustly high award will result in higher insurance premiums for all 
insured drivers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland should act to align Maryland 
with the growing number of jurisdictions that have abrogated the par-
ent-child tort immunity. The court of appeals is the preferable forum 
for several reasons. First, it is appropriate for the judiciary to extin-
guish the doctrine it created. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
which incorporated the immunity into state law, should assume the re-
sponsibility for removing this defense which produces results that are 
antagonistic to its stated purposes. Second, sufficient basis for legisla-
tive abrogation of the doctrine has existed for the past fifty-three years, 
without fruition.234 In response to the General Assembly's reluctance 
to nullify other anachronistic laws, the Maryland judiciary has recently 
taken an active role and has abolished or modified the outdated 
laws.235 The court of appeals should continue its pragmatic re-evalua-
tion of state law and abrogate the parent-child tort immunity. 
If the court deems a limited parental defense to be beneficial after 
abrogation, it should adopt a guideline that protects the parent in his 
execution of parental duties while safeguarding the rights of parent and 
child to pursue recovery for those injuries that are extrinsic to their 
relationship as parent and child. The selected standard should be 
modeled after the common law parental privilege to govern, which suc-
ceeded in protecting the integrity of the family without destroying the 
legal rights of the family members. 
Rhonda Ilene Fromm 
233. The jury is frequently aware that the plaintiff and defendant are friendly and that 
the suit is not truly adverse between the parties. "When the parent and child are 
seen leaving the courtoom hand-in-hand, there is little uncertainty left as to who is 
going to pay any judgment." Comment,lntra.famity Tort Immunity in Virginia: A 
Doctrine in Decline, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 273, 304 n.195 (1979). 
234. The inequities resulting from application of the immunity have been apparent 
since the court first adopted the doctrine in the 1930 case of Schneider v. Schnei-
der, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). 
235. See Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980) (tort of criminal conversa-
tion); Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 404 A.2d 1073 (1979) (doctrine of accessory-
ship); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (interspousal tort 
immunity). For a discussion of Kline, see 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 205 (1980). For a 
discussion of Lusby, see 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 584 (1979). 
